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Summary  findings
Rajapatirana  examines  the main distinctions  between  that have created regional integration  schemes have not
trade liberalization  under the General  Agreement  on  followed  it. These regional trading agreements have not
Tariffs and Trade (GATI) and under regional trading  increased  protection, but neither has there been across-
agreements.  Under the GATT,  trade liberalization  is  the-board trade liberalization.
based on the most-favored-nation  principle. Under  Regional  trading agreements  carry with them the
regional  trade agreements,  it is based on preferential  danger of trade diversion (when  imports that used to
trade.  come  from third countries at lower prices become
Establishing  regional trade agreements  does not  costlier because of preferential  access  granted to a
necessarily  lead to greater regional integration. The  higher-cost  regional source).
European Economic  Community  has been an exception,  How can Latin American  countries reduce trade
and with greater integration, regional  trade has grown  diversion  in their regional trading agreements?
steadily.  The Associaton of South East Asian  Nations  * Keep  protection low in the first place.
(ASEAN)  has been a weak association,  but trade among  * Have open regional trade associations  (so that it is
ASEAN  members has increased  rapidly because  member  easy  for new partners to join).
countries have undertaken multilateral  wade  *  Continue liberalmng trade with the rest of the
liberalization.  world, foliowing  the most-favored-nation  principle.
The efforts of Ladn American  countries to create  *  Establish  common markets rather than free trade
regional trade associations  in the 1960s, based on  areas (because  rules of origin create new barriers,
protectionist policies, reduced trade not only regionally,  induding bureaucracies).
but with the rest of the world. In contras;  the Latin  * Coordinate regulatory and competition  policies.
American  regional trading agreements  of the 1980s and  Eliminate  laws that limit competiion and adopt common
1990s have lberalized trade among the groups.  external taiffi.
Proper regional trading agreements must conform to  - Improve roads, ports, and means  of
Articde  XXIV of the GAIT, but nearly all the counties  communications.
This  paper-aproductof  the Advisory  Group,  Latin  America  and  the CaribbeanTcchnical  Department-ispartof  alargereffort
to disseminate  lessons  about policy  and  institutional reform that are rcelvant to the region. Copies of the paper are available free
from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contactJoyTroncoso,  room I8-314, cxtension  37826
(31 pages).  October 1994.
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I.  Introduction
Two parallel movements  have dominated  trade treaty making in the 1980s and the
1990s. These  are the initiation  and the successful  negotiation  of the Uruguay  Round  of
multilateral trade negotiations  and the resurgence (or in some cases the genesis) of regional
trade treaties or agreements.  Not surprisingly the initiation  and progress of both types of
treaties  have  been  closely  related. They  lead  to issues  related  to the evolution  of these
agreenents and the potential for trade creation.
Trade  treaties  have  a long history  and a wide  variety  thrughout the world. The
broadest  possible  way to classify  them  is to distinguish  between  those  that lead to equal
treatment  of all on a multilateral  basis and those  that are preferential  treaties  which  bestow
special  access  into the markets  of member  countries. This classification  is based on the
principle  that is a cornerstone  of post-war  trading  arrangements-  the most favored  nation
(MFN)  principle. Simnply  put, MFN means  that any access  given  to the market  of a country
has to be extended  to all other  members. The General  Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)  is based  on this principle  and the successor  to GATT,  the World  Trade Organization
(WTO),  will be based  even  more strongly  on this principle. Any other trade treaty  between
two or more member  countries  is a departure  from that principle  if it bestows  access  to each
other's market  that is not automatically  granted  to all others. Preferential  trade agreements,
whether  they be free trade areas, customs  unions,  or economic  unions,  are thus departures
from the MFN  principle. There  is another  important  distinction  between  the GATT  and any
other treaty. That is, all other  trade treaties  have  to be recognized  within  the GATT
agreement. GATT  is unique. Membership  in GATT  automatically  creates  a treaty  with all
others who are members  of the world  trading  system. Hence  the term "general  agreement."
Non-members,  such  as the former Soviet  Union,  were excluded  from MFN access  in the-2  -
past.  In contrast, the other trade treaties are not general or multilateral  trade arrangements.
They are not unique in the sense of being based on MFN.  They can and do take many
shapes and fonns.
This paper examines the main distinctions  between the GATT and other agreements
henceforth referred to as regional trade agreements (RTAs), the evolution of the main
agreements in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, to see whether there is an inexorable pattern
or logic to their evolution. It then analyses, in the broadest possible terms, the effects of the
RTAs to determine their advantages  and disadvantages  from the perspective of both the
international  economy and an individual  group of countries.  The paper notes that MFN
based trade is first best and that the departures from that principle could be beneficial only to
the extent that they lead to or GATT-plus  trade, which implies that more net trade is created
than possible under MFN trade liberalization  on a unilateral basis.  It recognizes the inherent
dangers that lurk outside the MFN framework, and it delineates the possible ways of
minimizing these risks.  A final section  gives the main conclusions.
HI. GATT and Regional Trade Arrangements
There is a long history of trade treaties in the world.  This includes treaties such as
the Zollverein treaty that created free trade among the German states in 1832, the Cobden-
Chevalier treaty of 1870 that led to free trade between Britain and France, and the
commercial  treaty between Spain and Portugal of 1893 which provided for reciprocal free
entry.  After the Second World War GATT was born out of the Treaty of Havana of 1947.
GATT became one of the key elements for establishing  a stable international  economic order
as it provided the rules and disciplines for carrying out international  trade.
Under the aegis of GATT there has been a significant  reduction of trade bafliers
through several rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. Before the GATT came into
existence the average tariff protection among advanced industrialized  countries was above-3-
100%.  By 1993, after seven rounds  of multilateral  trade negotiations,  the average  tariff had
fallen to 5%.'  This liberalization  process was accompanied  bty'  hug  increases in trade flows.
Between  1950  and 1970  international  trade grew at a rate of P.  percent annually, outpacing
the growth of world output.  During the 1980s  world trade gr:ew  at annual  rates of between
6 and 9 percent. 3 Trade in manufactures  was the most dynamic. In 1965  the proportion  of
world trade represented  by industrial  goods was 54 percent; by 1989, it had reached  73
percent. 4
GATT Negotiating  Rounds
Number of
Round  Dates  Countries  Value of Trade Covered (US$)
Geneva  1947  23  10 billion
Annecy  1949  33  n.a.
Torquay  1950  34  n.a.
Geneva  1956  22  2.5 billion
Dillon  1961  45  4.9 billion
Kennedy  1962  48  40 billion
Tokyo  1973  99  155 billion
Uruguay  1986  124  - 755 billion
Source:  Quoted in Jagdish Bhagwati. The World Trading System at Risk.  Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University  Press.  1991. p.  8 and, GATT.  Focus.
GATT Newsletter. No.107.  Special  Issue.  May 1994. pp.  1, 8.
Regional  trade agreements  were accommodated  within  GAIT,  although  this actually
meant a departure  from the MFN principle. 5 They were initially  allowed  because  they could
constitute  a movement  toward achieving  freer trade. 6 The creation of regional  trade
XSebastian  Edwards.  Trade and Industrial  Policy  Reform  in Latin  America." Cambridge,  MA:  (1994) NBER
Working Paper Series. No. 4772. p. 42.
2 World Bank.  World Development  Report. 1987. Washington,  D.C.: Oxford  University  Press, 1987. p. 14.
3 Diana Brand.  "Regional  Bloc Formation  and World Trade," in Intereconomics. November/December  1992.
Vol. 27.  No. 6.  p. 274.
Tid.  p.  277.
5Jagdish  Bhagwati.  The World Trading  System  at Risk. Princeton,  New  Jersey:  Princeton  University  Press, 1991.
p. 69.
6 Kenneth W. Dam.  The GATT: Law and the Intemational  Economic  Oreanization. Chicago: University  of
Chicago Press, 1970. p. 19.-4-
agreements  was sanctioned  through Article XXIV of GAIT  which establishes the conditions
for the existence of customs unions and free trade areas.  In spite rnf  the initial attempt to
close all possible loopholes  to avoid RTAs of less than 100 percent preferences (i.e.,
covering all sectors), the ambiguities  of Article XXIV, as well as political  pressures,
combined to allow RTAs of less than 100 percent preferences - a substantial  departure from
the MFN principle.  Developing  countries sought special and differential treatment for the
establishment  of regional trade arrangements  among themselves. The incorporation  of the
Enabling Clause in 1979 as a result of the Tokyo Round established  the principles for the
creation of RTAs among developing  countries.  The Enabling Clause allows these countries
to establish "regional and global preferential arrangements  among developing  countries not
conforming to Article XXIV." 7 From past experiences  it seems that RTAs need to operate
under a very specific set of conditions in order to reach higher levels of trade than those that
could be achieved under pure MFN and what has been called GATT-plus trade creation.
The main provisions of article XXV mimize  the departure from MFN through the
requirement  that RTAs must be based on the reduction of protection and that this reduction
should be across the board (i.e.,  100% preference). These have been ignored with impunity.
As Kenneth Dam observed more than twenty years ago, the ambiguity  of the article, the lack
of strong dispute settlement  power within GAIT, and political realities had made these
provisions somewhat  of a dead letter.'  In addition, developing  countries received exemption
from the provisions.  More recently, the centrifugal forces of Europe and the US changed
stance towards the departure from the MFN principle have led to the greater accommodation
of the regional trading agreements. Indeed, the Latin American continent  saw the virtual
proliferation of agreements ranging from the resurrection of the Andean group to the
formation of Mercosur and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Sixteen
framework agreements have been signed between the US and 31 Latin American countries
'John  Whalley.  "Non-Discrimintory Discrimination:  Special and Differntal  Treatment under the GATT for
Developing Countries," inThe Economic  Journal. No. 100. December 1990. p. 1321.
'Kenneth Dam The GATT: Law and the International  Economic  Organization.  Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press. 1970.-5-
towards  the creation  of a Western  Hemisphere  Free Trade  Agreement.  These  agreements
aim to facilitate  trade  and investnent  through  consultative  mechanisms  and could  be the basis
for an enlargement  of NAFTA. Other  agreements  such  as the Group  of Three, among
Colombia,  Mexico  and Venezuela,  the associated  status  that could  be extended  to Chile  under
NAFTA  or the agreement  between  Chile  and Mexico,  all point  to the impetus  given  to RTAs
in the region. Moreover,  the commitnent  of foreign  ministries  to forge  trade  agreements  as
a part of the regional  political  unity  has meant  that the evaluation  of economic  benefits  and
the difficulties  of implementing  agreements  without  adequate  policy  consistency  among
member  countries  took  a back  seat to political  objectives.  In the event  it becomes  even  more
important  to consider  the ways  in which  the benefits  from these  agreements  could  be realized
and the costs  of trade diversion  minimizd.
m.  Trade Treaties  as an Evolutionary  Process
Following  the classification  between  GATT  and the RTAs  it is useful  to consider
whether  there  is a distinct  evolutionary  process  at work  for these  two tes  of trade treaties.
The evolutionary  process  insofar  as the GAIT is concerned  seems  clear  enough.
GATT  has evolved  from  restricted  trade  to more  open  trade  given  the built-in  tendency  for
trade  to become  increasingly  free under  the GAIT. The internal  logic  of MFN  involves  both
a reduction  of costs  and greater  competition.  In practice  this has resulted  in reduced
protection  and the increased  coverage  of world  trade  under  MFN. Any  trade liberalization  is
extended  to all members  of GAIT and the reduction  of tariffs  is bound. However,  since
RTAs  are included  within  the GATT  framework,  it seems  that  while  overall  trade  has been
liberalized,  more  trade  has come  under  regional  arrangements.  This  appearance  is deceptive.
While  RTAs  have  proliferated,  trade under  RTAs  has  not. There  has  been  much  greater
trade expansion  under MFN basis th  under preferential  trade.  Thus, overall trade growth
has clearly  exceeded  the growth  in preferential  trade. It is bound  to increase  more  in the-6-
future given that the rules of international  trade discipline  are being made more transparent
and the processes for dispute  settlement  more effective  under WTO than has been the case in
the GATT.  Moreover, article XXIV  has been given  more bite with the definition  of the
transition  arrangements. Also, the method of calculating  average  tariff prior to reducing
protection  under an RTA has been defined  clearly.9 GATT-sanctioned  trade treaties are
more prone to move to increasingly  less protective  trade on a multilateral  basis.
On the other hand, RTAs do not seem to inexorably  follow  a trade creating  pattern as
a general proposition. It is sometimes  assumed  that RTAs will follow an evolutionary
process that will result in the increase  of trade.  This gradual evolution  to free trade has not
been the rule.  Article XXIV  allows a transition  period to adjust  to more liberal trade,
however, most RTAs do not lead to total liberalization. In the past RTAs notified  to GATT
under Article XXIV have not been specific  about transition  periods and they have excluded
some sectors from preferential  access.
TIhe  motive for the attempt  at integration  in Latin  America  came from the idea that
preferential  treatment would  expand  trade and make it easier to reach economies  of scale in
industrial  production. This was very much the philosophy  of the Economic  Commission  for
Latin America  during the 1960s. However,  past Latin  American  trade arrangements  led to
very limited trade expansion  among  the regional  groups  given that the treaties incorporated  a
protectionist  approach  and involved  strong discriminatory  practices and complex  regulations.
The expansion  of trade would not have been net trade creating  given the protectionist  stances
of the member  countries. These RTAs also represented  a clear departure from the MFN
principle and put in jeopardy  the possibilities  of increasing  trade at the regional  and the
international  levels.  They ended up reducing  trade among  the regional  partners and isolating
these countries  from the international  economy. There was hardly any participation  of Latin
American  countries in the earlier GATT rounds. Some  were not even members. For
9 This is only for free trade areas.  It does not apply to customs  unions.-7-
example,  Mexico  joined only in 1986,  Bolivia  and Costa  Rica  in 1989,  while El Salvador,
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Paraguay,  and Venezuela  negotiated  their  ac:ession  after 1991.
The European  Experience
The apparent  success  of the European  Economic  Community  (EC) inspired  Latin
American  countries  towards  regional  integration.
The EC was created  with  the initial  support  of the US and "was  stimulated  by
European  oligopolies"' 0 that saw in a European  market  an opportunity  for enhancing  their
competitiveness.  Although  the US was not enthusiastic  about  the formation  of RTAs,  the
creation  of the EC was a way  of reaping  geo-strategic  benefits  of Westem  European
economic  unity as this would  act as a counterbalance  to Soviet  power.
The European  Common  Market  has evolved  in distinctive  phases. The establishment
of the European  Coal  and Steel  Community  was the initial  step towards  the creation  of the
European  Economic  Community  that was established  in 1957  with  the Treaty  of Rome. The
second  stage (1973-85)  involved  the incorporation  of new  members  as well as the reduction
of tariffs. The third stage  began  in December  1985  when  the European  Commission  passed
the Single  European  Market  (SEM)  Act. This  Act was an amendment  to the Treaty  of Rome
and aimed  at the complete  elimination  of bafliers  to the movement  of goods, services  and
factors  of production  within  the community.  The  completion  of the single  market  by 1992
was intended  to make  of Europe  a stronger  entity  within  the international  economy."I  The
1992  Maastricht  Treaty  resolved  to move  towards  a common  European  currecy.
FD  Prans  Buelens. "Regional  Blocs in the World  Economy,"  in Intereconomics.  Vol. 27, No. 3.  p. 131.
May/June  1992.
Andr6  Sapir. "Does  1992  Come  Before  or After 1990?  On  Regional  versus  Multilateral  Integration."  Centre
for Economic  Policy  Research. Discussion  Paper  Series. No. 313. May 1989. p. 1.-- 8-
The EC has begun the fourth phase  of integration  which  may end up with a full union
with no barriers among  its members  countries,  a common  currency a single monetary
authority  and fi'scal  system, and common  regulatory  framework  and laws.  Economic
integration  has also involved  political  integration  and the introduction  of common  policies in
areas such as social and environmental  matters, or foreign  and security  policy.  With respect
to the EC's future perspective,  it seems  unlikely  that the single market will become a
"Fortress Elurope"  because  the consolidation  of a European  Union involves  a huge process of
deregulation. In fact "the single market process will probably accelerate  the opening  of the
less-open  EC economies  in the 1990s."I2  This process  of gradual  economic  integration  was
motivated  by political  will of European  leaders  to strengthen  their position  vis-a-vis  the US
and Japan.
The EC is the only RTA that has followed  gradual and well defined stages for
deepening  the process of economic  integration. The EC's successful  gradual integration  sets
a logical  pattern to the evolution  of a trade treaty from an agreement  on specific  sectors to a
common  market and an economic  union.  The pattern of liberalization  of trade within the
Community  was mainly  based on the liberlization of manufactres and not on a
liberalization  across the board.  Sectors  such as agriculture  were clearly  excluded  from
preferential  access maling this scheme  incompatible  with the MFN principle and inconsistent
with the provisions  of Article XXIV.
From 1958  to 1972  integration  accompanied  multilateral  trade liberalization  under the
GATT rounds.  The EC's common  external  tariff for manufactured  products was reduced
according to the tariff reductions  in the Dillon and Kennedy  Rounds. Thus, during its first
stage the EC's trade activity  resulted in an "GATT-plus"  situation  given that there was an
expansion  of extra-regional  trade leading  to trade creation.' 3 Trade in agricultural  products
was the exception  as this sector experienced  considerable  trade diversion. During the second
12Gerhard  Pohl and Piritta  Sorsa. European  Inte,ration  and  Trade  with  the Developimn  World. Washington,  D.C.:
The World Bank, Policy and Research  Series. No. 21, 1992. p. 11.
3 Andr6 Sapir.  Art. cit.  p. Hi.-9  -
stage  (197345), the tariff reductions  from the Tokyo  Round  gave rise to further trade
creation in manufactures  but again  this was not the case in agriculture:  the Common
Agricultural  Policy (CAP) led to an increase  of trade diversion. The second  phase of
integration  differed  from the initial  one in that external  trade in manufactured  products
inceased faster.  Also during  this period  there was a relative  slowdown  in the levels  of intra-
regional  trade as member  countries  used protectionist  measures  to reduce  intra-Community
trade.  This was mainly  due to the period  of slow  growth  and high unemployment  that these
countries  suffered  at the time.  The evolution  of the EC was orchestrated  by a supra-national
authority  with very rigid  rules of conduct,  with high costs arising  from the maintenance  of
uncompetitive  activities  such as agriculture  which led to huge subsidies.
At a more general  level, as a result of the first stage  of integration,  exports among  EC
countries increased from 37.2% in 1958 to 53.4% in 1970.  Intra-regional  imports also
experienced  the same increasing  perfonnance  going from 35.2% to 50.3% during the same
years.  EC exports within the region  reduced  by one percentage  point from 53.4% to 52.4%
between  1970 and 19715.  During  those same  years EC exports  to the rest of the world grew
from 34.9% to 37%.  With  respect  to inta-regional  imports,  its share  declined  from 50.3% to
49.3% during 1970-80. Imports  from the rest of the world EFTA not included)  experienced
a slight growth  going from 41% to 42.1%.'4
To illustrate  the scope  of an RTA in terms of trade creation  the case of the automotive
industry comes in handy.  When the EC came into existence  protection  granted to the auto
industry was high.  Import tariffs in France and Great Britain were at 30 percent, in Italy
between  35 and 45 percent,  and in West  Germany  around  20 percent. During  the 1960s  trade
in automotive  products  among  EC countries  increased  probably  due to the trade-creating  effect
of this RTA. Between  1958  and 1965  intra-EC  trade in cars increased  by almost  400 percent.  1 s
'  Andr6  Sapir. 'Regional Integration in Europe," in The  Economic  Journal. Vol. 102, No. 415. November 1992.
p.  1493.
'5 Rhys 0. Jenkins. Dependent Industrialization  in Latin America. The Automotive  Industr  in Argentina, Chile
and Mexico. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. p. 25.- 10  -
By 1968 tariffs for intra-regional  trade in cars were reduced to zero.  This liberalization  allowed
an increase in intra-regional trade in vehicles and led to the establishment of new plants in
several European countries.  Exports grew at a faster rate than production as is illustrated by
the fact that French cars increased their share in the German market from 2 percent to almost
14 percent between 1958 and 1970. Imports of German cars into the French market went from
1 percent to almost 11 percent while imports of Italian vehicles into that same market also
increased from 0.2 to around 6 percent during the same years.  Trade liberalization allowed
European firms to integrate their operations. This was the case of Renault, Peugeot, and Volvo
who jointly were more capable of producing engines at full scale.  Tariff reduction under the
EC resulted is a GATT-plus situation  because a more open trade regime allowed the creation of
trade.
The East Asian Experience
A contrasting experience to that of the EC is East Asia's.  RTAs in this region have
been rather weak as these countries have been more supportive of an open multilateral
trading system.  In 1967 six countries-Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand-formed  the Association  of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with
the initial purpose of ensuring their joint security.  In 1976 ASEAN developed the first and
only attempt to promote regional economic integration 16 along with some development
programs.  These countries aimed at increasing intra-regional trade driven by an outward-
oriented trade policy consistent with the MFN principle.  ASEAN was constituted on the
basis of tariff elimination across-the-board. Notwithstanding  the lack of cohesion within
ASEAN and the absence of an RTA for the whole Asia Pacific region, intra-regional trade in
Asia has expanded rapidly.  Countries in East Asia are trading more among themselves
"simply because its markets have become so important."'7 East Asia's export within the
1 6 Arvind Panagariya.  'East Asia: A New Trading Bloc?' in Finance and Development. Vol. 31, No. 1, 1994.
p. 16.
"'The NVorld  Bank. Development  in Practice. East Asia's Trade and Investnent.  Washington,  D.C.: World Bank.
1994. p. 23.- 11  -
region increased from 35.6 % in 1988 to 40.5% in 1992.  Intra-regional imports also
experienced growth going from 42.6% in 1988 to 47% in 1992.  COutside  the region exports
to the US declined from almost 30% to 25% during the same years.  Imports also went down
from 10% to 17.4%.18 Higher costs in Japan and the NICs have led to a shift of industries
to other East Asian countries increasing the trade in sectors such as electronic components
and machinery.  Japanese exports to the region have shown a growing trend; in 1991,
Japan's trade with the rest of Asia was larger than its trade with the US.9
In addition to ASEAN other regional initiatives in East Asia have been the East Asian
Economic Group and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.  The formation of the East Asian
Economic Group (EAEG) was proposed as a means of addressing the potential threat that
other RTAs would pose for the economic activity of this region.  The major players in the
EAEG are Japan and China, the four NICs (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and
four ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand).  There is some
skepticism about the approach in the region.  Most potential members (with the exception of
Malaysia) have not considered the creation of EAEG a viable proposition as they have
benefitted substantially from expanding multilateral  trade.  Instead, several bilateral trade
agreements did come into existence between China and Japan, the US and Japan, and the US
and the Philippines."  In 1989 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was
established as a forum to discuss issues in intenational trade and as a possible counterweight
to discriminatory practices.  The East Asian economies  have a close trade relationship with
the whole world.  Given that two thirds of their trade is carried out in the international
market, it is more in the interest of these countries to maintain a strong open international
trading system rather than to pursue preferential trade.  Their interest towards strengthenig
their own regional trade was induced by the negotiation  of NAFTA.  The economic ministers
IsThe World Bank.  Development  in Practice. East Asia's Trade and Investnent.  Washington,  D.C.:  1994. pp.
82-83.
19  Diana Brand.  Art. Cit.  p. 279.
20The World Bank.  1994.  Op. cit. p. 68.- 12 -
of ASEAN have "expressed concern that NAFTA might become  an exclusionary  regional
economic  bloc."2"
East Asian and ASEAN's trade performance  has been remarkably good.  This is ffie
region that has shown the most dynamic  growth in trade since the 1960s (see Appendix
Table).  As opposed to the European experience  these countries  have sought to establish
stronger links with the international  economy.  They have relied on the MFN principle which
has proven to be extremely  helpful for trade expansion. Over the last 25 years East Asia's
exports increased more than thirty-fold  to about US$850  billion.  East Asia's share of world
exports increased from about 7 percent to 21 percent during this period.  It is clear that
GATT and MFN provided a supportive  environment  for East Asian trade activities. The
region did not require the creation of a regional trade arrangement. Adherence to MFN
proved to be superior to any  -kind  of RTA.
Thus, economic integration  in East Asia followed a very different evolution process
from the EC.  Attempts  to create RTAs have been rather weak, if deliberately  so, and the
scope of the agreements  narrow.  The thrust of regional economic  integration has been
overshadowed  by a multilateral  approach to the world market.  East Asian economies  depend
on resources within and outside the region.  These countries felt that they were  too small or
too narrowly endowed  to be self-sufficient."22  Most of them have encouraged  linkages with
the world market and have developed  the infrastructure and business experience  to coordinate
international  investment, production and trade.  Trade has been the instument for economic
growth in East Asia.
21  Richard  Steinberg.  "Antidotes  to Regionalism:  Responses  to Trade  Diversion  Effects  of  the  North  American  Free
Trade Agreement," in Stanford  Journal of Intermational  Law.  Vol. 29.  Summer 1993. p. 317.
I  The World Bank. QO.  cit.  1994. p. 21.
23 Ibid. p. 28.- 13 -
Lain  American Experience
When comparing the Latin American experience with these two regions the issue that
arises is whether it is better to adjust to GATT rules and disciplines as in the East Asian
case, or if it is worth getting involved in an RTA of the European Community type.  There
are several elements that need to be taken into consideration to assess the costs that the Latin
American region would have to pay for departing from the MFN principle.
Since the 1940s regional economic integration in Latin America was considered an
instrument for promoting economic growth and industrialization. In the 1960s the European
experience stimulated Latin American countries to follow a path of regional economic
integration, although based on a completely  different economic approach.?  The Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) created in 1960 incorporated the import
substitution orientation for Latin American industrialization  policies.  In order to deepen the
import substituting industrialization  process, those countries which had small markets tried to
reach economies of scale through the preferential opening of their markets.  It was felt that
regional trade agreements would lead to rapid industialization.
In 1969 the Andean Pact was established as a sub-regional agreement within LAFTA.
The Andean Pact showed the worst performance in terms of intra-regional trade given the
complex regulations set to implement  the agreement and the emphasis on promoting import
substitution.  The attempts of the 1960s could not be successful given that these agreements
did not 'use  trade liberalization and hence prices to guide industry allocation."  Instead this
was done through a bureaucratic negotiation in which regional integration programs tried to
replicate each country's distorted inward domestic-oriented  policies.
24 Jagdish Bhagwati.  09.  cit.  1991. p. 70.
2 5Idem.- 14  -
LAFTA and the Andean  Pact were not capable of increasing  trade in the region nor at
the world level.  These RTAs were negotiated  on a product-by-product  approach instead of
covering all sectors of the economy.  Complete  sectors were excluded or privileged
according to the domestic and political  interest witiin each country.  Hemispheric  trade was
far from dynamic.  The share of intra-regional  trade in the total region's trade fell between
1978 and 1989, quite contrary to the objectives of expanding  intra-regional  trade.26
The Central American Common  Market (CACM) formed by Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala,  Honduras, and Nicaragua  also followed  an inward-oriented  trade strategy but was
more "successful" in expanding intra-regional  trade.  Unlike other Latin American initiatives
at the time, the CACM provided a liberalization  across-the-board  based on the MFN
principle.'  The purpose was to reach a common  market which would provide a preferential
market for import substituting  industries. This liberal approach adopted among the member
countries was evident in the non-discriminatory  rules and in the national  treatment granted to
investment. During the 1970s the CACM suffered a crisis due to the "internal frictions
mounted  over equitable  sharing of benefits"'  and, in 1986, the collapse of the Cental
American payments clearing  mechanism marked the disintegration  of the CACM.
The 1980s were a decade of major economic  trnsformation for the Latin American
economies  and a period for renovating  regional integration  schemes.  Lhe  need to respond to
the region's financial and economic  crisis led to the liberalization  of most Latin American
trade policies and to the adoption  of outward-oriented  trade strategies coupled with economic
stabilition  and the privatization  of many public enterprises. Latin American countries
carried out a substantial  unilateral trade liberalization  process without precedent.?
76Susan Hickok, et al.  The Uruguay  Round of GATT Trade Negotiations.  New York: Federal Reserve Bank  of
New York.  Research Paper.  June 1991. pp. 21.-22.
n1Julio J.  Nogues  and Rosalinda  Quinxaniila.  "Latin  America's Integration  and the Multilateral  Trading  System."
Paper presented  at the conference  on New  Dimensions  in Regional  Economic  Integration. The World Bank
and Centre for Economic  Policy Research. April 2-3. 1992. pp. 10-11.
23 Ibid.  p. 32.
9 Asad Alam and Sarath Rajapatirana. Trade Polkv Reform in Latin Amenrica  and the Caribbean in the 1980s.
Worldng Paper 1104. Washington,  D.C.: World Bank.  1993.- 15  -
The Latin American countries made revisions to the trade agreements of the 1960s
with the idea of revitalizing the process of regional economic integration which started a new
wave of regionalism.  These schemes of regional economic integration differ substantially
from those of the 1960s as they acknowledge  the need of Latin American economies to
compete in the world market and to increase market access for their exports.  This trend was
taking place within a context of export promotion and growth of international trade
throughout most of the developing world. 30 Bhagwati observed that, "this is a second
regionalization based on open trade compared to the first regionalization based on
protection.  "31
Recent RTAs are different from those of the 1960s in another aspect.  They go
beyond the liberalization of trade in goods; they also cover other areas such as investment,
services or transportation (this has been called "deep integration").  Some of them are
revisions of existing regional agreements while others are completely new.  Among those
RTAs that resurrected are the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market.
Among the new agreements are Mercosur, the Group of Three, and several bilateral trade
arrangements.
The Andean Pact was revived after years of near total stagnation.  Renovating this
pact involved not only trade in goods but also the liberalization in other areas.  The new
agreement established the creation of a free trade zone starting in 1992; an agreement on the
level and structure of the common external tariff (CET) starting December 1991 and the
implementation  of the CET by December 1995.  It went beyond trade to cover the
liberalization of maritime and air transportation as well as that of foreign investment and
capital mobility within the Andean group.?  In spite of this integration effort, the level of
intra-regional trade remained quite low.  The process of determining the CET has been
30Sebastian Edwards.  Art. cit.  p. 34.
31  Jagdish Bhagwati.  "Regionalism  versus Multilateralism," in The World Economy. Vol. 15, No. 5.  September
1992-  p. 542.
32  Sebastian Edwards.  Art. cit.  p. 37.- 16 -
extremely contentious because there is a lack of commitment  to compromise and to grant
concessions.  Given the reluctance to pay the price of adjustment that regional integration
demands, it is hard to contemplate  the successful completion of the Andean integration
process.  This RTA has faced more serious obstacles than other recent arrangements in the
region.
In Central America the pacification of the region as well as the economic reforms
have led to a renewal of regional integration efforts.  The CACM aims to establish a
common market.  The range for the common external tariff has been set at a level between 5
and 20 percent.  This is also consistent with its initial liberal approach.  The CACM has
incorporated two new members; Panama which was not a member earlier, and Honduras,
which had withdrawn in 1969.  The CACM has an open and liberal orientation.  It seeks to
increase trade among its members and with the rest of the world.  The trade liberalization
process has also been accompanied  by fiscal and monetary policies which are aimed at a
stable macroeconomic environment.
In March 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the Asuncion Treaty
which established Mercosur.  Under the agreement Brazil and Argentina are scheduled to
phase out all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade by the end of 1994 while
Uruguay and Paraguay will have an additional year.  By 1995 it is expected that almost all
trade barriers among the four member countries will be removed; identical trade policies are
to be established with a framework to adopt a common external tariff to govern international
trade between Mercosur and the rest of the world in the future.  Mercosur also covers
agricultural, industrial, monetary, financial, and transportation policies and sets common
rules to deal with subsidies, dumping ,and other unfair trade practices.  Mercosur's future
largely depends on the policies of both Argentina and Brazil.'  The continuing
33  Brazil accounts for 82.2%  of total production  of goods and services, or US$ 375 bilIion out of a total Mercosur
market worth US$ 456 billion (Argentina makes up 15.1% of the total, Uruguay 1.5% and Paraguay
1.2%).  "Unifying the Hemisphere," in The Financial Post.  December 26,  1992, Saturday, Weekly
Edition.- 17 -
macroeconomic  instability  in Brazil casts a shadow  over the agreement  on a common  external
tariff even though a framework for it has now been agreed upon.
There has also been a proliferation  of bilateral or trilateral regional initiatives.
Colombia and Venezuela  have negotiated  a free trade agreement with Mexico known  as the
-G3 Agreement  (Grupo de los Tres) which will become effective  on January 1, 1995.  Mexico
has signed a free trade agreement  with Costa Rica and another one with Bolivia, and is in the
process of negotiating  agreements  with El Salvador, Guatemala,  and Honduras.  Colombia
has established  a customs union with Venezuela  and a free trade area with Ecuador.  So far
Colombia has been the "most energetic proponent  of free trade."'  When Gaviria became
president in 1991 Colombia  had no single trade agreement. By August 1994, Colombia
would have signed free trade arrangements  with 22 countries.  Mexico has also been very
active in regional integration  and has tried to develop stronger trade links with the rest of
Latin America through the creation  of regional  trade treaties.  It is expected that by the end
of the 1990s most tariffs within Latin America  will be completely  eliminated.3
Western  Hemisphere  Initiatives
US support for regionalism  became evident with its negotiation  of several bilateral
and regional trade agxeements  throughout  the 1980s. In 1983, consistent  with the orientation
towards regionalism  and following  the provisions in GAIT's  Article XXV,  the US
negotiated the Caribbean  Basin Act which covered liberalization  of trade and investment. In
1985 the US negotiated a free trade agreement  with Israel.
Regional  trade in North America was shaped after the 1965 Auto pact between
Canada and the US.  The Canada-US  Automotive  Products Agreement  of 1965 or Autopact
constituted a sectoral regional trade agreement  that served to integrate  production between
34 "In  Latin  America, a Free Trade Rush," in The New York Times. June 13, 1994. p. D5.
35 Ibid.- 18-
both countries.  The Autopact allowed a tariff reduction (17.5% to 0) on Canadian imports
from the US of autoparts and components to be used as original eq:iipment.  US imports
from Canada of similar products which had a 6.5% tariff became duty free under the
Autopact.  As a result of this reduction in tariffs, US vehicle manufacturers shifted part of
their production facilities to Canada and began producing certain models for both markets.
US plants were able to produce autoparts and components taking advantage of economies of
scale.
The Autopact allowed free trade in autoparts for vehicle producers in Canada and the
US.  Its result was a rapid increase in trade in both vehicles and components.  Tariff
reduction allowed a rationalization of production as well as a specialization  of plants in each
country.  This RTA has been considered a GATT-plus agreement because it led to higher
levels of trade than those that would have been possible under MEN at reduced protection.
The Autopact allowed the creation of trade as illustrated by the fact that during the first  10
years exports of US vehicles to the Canadian market increased by 10% while Canadian
exports to the US increased by more than 20%.  Given that Canada was the market that
maintained the higher tariff levels it experienced a more rapid trade growth when import
tariffs for automotive  products came down to zero.  Trade in autoparts and components also
had a significant increase, although it was not as strong given the Canadian performance
requirements of local content and trade balance, incorporated in the Autopact.3Y  In this
context a question arises as to whether Canada and the US could have reached higher levels
of trade creation if they had stuck to a MFN approach.  This is of course difficult to
determine because one can not know whether the prevailing MFN trade in cars was the best
possible, so that the increase in trade following Autopact is additional or GATT-plus.
However, this sectoral agreement was taken as an example of the benefits provided by
regional trade arrangements in terms of specialization  of production and enhanced
competitiveness.  The negotiation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) took
place in 1988.  At that time, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement was considered the most
36 Rhys Jenkins. Transnational Corporations and the Latin American Automobile Industnr.  London: McMillan,
1987. pp. 31-32.- 19-
ambitious project of regional economic  integration  after the EC. 37 The CUSFTA was
presented as an instrument  through which the US industry would be able to regain a
competitive  edge in the international  market because it would facilitate  the specialization  of
production and would eliminate  barriers to trade in goods and services.  Thus, the aim was
not only to facilitate trade, but more importantly,  to develop a mechanism  for building a
stronger bloc to compete vis-k-vis  the rest of the world.
The US also entered into trde  arrangements  with Mexico during the 1980s.  In 1985
both countries signed the Bilateral Agreement  on Subsidies  and Countervailing  Duties, and in
1987 the Framework Agreement  on Investment  and Trade.  Given the outward-orientation  of
the Mexican economy  following  the mid 1980's trade reforms and the rising administrative
protectionism  in the US market these agreements  were crucial for Mexico to have guaranteed
access of its exports to its main foreign market.  In 1991 Canada, Mexico and the US began
negotiations  for a trilateral free trade agreement  which also extended  to areas such as
investment, fmancial services, telecommunications,  and transportation. With the
incorporation  of Mexico the North American market would become  the largest single market
in the world with 360 million people and a GDP of around US$6 billion.  NAFTA can best
be described as a 'freer  rather than [a] free trade agreement" 39 because even after the
transition period is over some trade barriers will be in effect.
NAFTA is a case of a free trade association  between two industrialized  and one
developing  country.  It has been argued  that the gains for a developing  country from
integration with a rich country go beyond the trade efficiency  gains and this does apply to
Mexico.  In the event that the international  trading system would evolve into a series of
inward-looking  arrangements  such integration  guarantees  futue  access to a large market.
With this large market, it is most likely that the developing  country like Mexico could
37  Juan A. de Castro and Serafino  Marchese. El Acuerdo  de Libre  coanercio  entre Estados  Unidos  v Canadi v su
Impacto  sobre  el Comercio  de America  Latina  v el Caribe. Geneva:  UNCTAD. September 1990. Paper
#33.  p. 1.
38  Kym Anderson  and Richard  H. Snape. "European  and  American  Regionalism:  Effects  on and Options  for Asia."
Centre for Economic  Policy Research. Discussion  Paper Series.  No. 983.  p. 13.- 20 -
maintain  a certain level of efficiency  and have access  to new  technology.39  Thus, for Mexico
the negotiation  of a free trade agreement  with the US appeared  as the best mechanism  for
securing  access  to the American  market  which  represents  around  70 percent of its exports,  to
increase  foreign  investment  inflows,  and to reduce  the uncertainties  derived  from
administrative  protectionism  in the US.'0 In addition,  a free trade agreement  with the US
added  discipline  and certainty  over domestic  policy  reforrms  in Mexico. On the US part,
even  though  labor and environmental  organizations  lobbied  against  signing  a free trade
agreement  with Mexico, the NAFTA  negotiations  were  justified  on th. basis of improving
the competitive  position  of US industry  and the creation  of jobs.
Unlike  the regional  trade initiatives  of the 1960s  it seems  that the new wave  of
"regionalism  is likely to endure  this time." 41 It is difficult  to assess  the gains and losses  from
intra-regional  trade to the whole international  trading  system. The proliferation  of regional
trade arrangements  does not necessarily  mean  a more open inernational  trading  system  or
that these agreements  are "cooperative  across  groups."42  RTAs  have increased  the use of
non-tariff  barriers and protectionist  measures. For example,  in the 1990s  the share of
inports subject  to non-tariff  barriers in the EC has increased. Anti-dumping  measures  and
voluntary  export  restraints  (VERs)  have also been  widely  used for granting  protection  to
domestic  producers. Restrictive  rules of origin  have  also acted  as barriers to trade.
Regional  initiatives  among  Latin  American  countries  differ from those  of the 1960s  because
they are outward-oriented  while  almost  all participants  have  undergone  a process of unilateral
trade liberalization  as pan of major  domestic  economic  reforms.
39  Jaime de Melo.  Arvind Panagariya and Dani Rodrik.  The New Regionalism. The World Bank: Washington,
D-C.  February 1993.  Working Paper Series 1094.  p. 20.
4e  Julio J. Nogues and Rosalinda Quintanilla.  Art. Qit. p. 36.
41  jagdish Bhagwati.  Art. Cit. p. 540.
4  Sebastian Edwards.  Art. cit. p.  42..- 21 -
IV.  Trade  Creation  and  Welfare Effects
The advantages and disadvantages of RTAs have to be evaluated from the welfare
effects of these departures from MFN.  Early analysis by Viner was based on the concept of
trade creation and trade diversion, which was essentially a static analysis of welfare gains 43.
If net trade creation is positive then an RTA is considered to be beneficial to the parties
creating it.  A more dynamic view of these initiatives must take into account the learning,
coordination, and bargaining position of the RTAs compared to their absence.  Such an
analysis must incorporate political economy elements of forming RTAs.  Bhagwati observes
that this analysis must consider the interests of three main agents: govermments  of member
countries, interest groups within member countries and interest groups and goverrnents
outside member countries".
In theory, it has been shown that welfare-improving FTAs could well be designed.
Kemp and Wan demonstrated that when creating an RTA (in this case a customs union), the
member countries could adopt a common external tariff structure that is endogenously
determined, which could improve their welfare without hurting the rest of the world.  The
main idea is that "the common set of tariffs may be chosen in such a way that the external
terms of trade and hence the quantities trade[d] with the outside world are unchanged while
internal trade is rearranged to maximize the gains from it."I  When trade creation occurs as a
result of specialization, a regional trade agreement can become a mechanism for improving
the welfare of the trading partner's  economies.'
43  Jacob Viner.  The Customs Union lssue, Camegie Endowment for International Peace. 1950.
4Jagdish  Bhagwati.  "Regionalism versus Multilateralism."  The World Economn.  1992.  Vol. 15. No. 5.
4 Jaime de Melo,  Arvind Panagariya and Dani Rodrilc. The New Reueionalism. Working Paper Series 1094.
Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank.  Febnmary  1993.  p. 6.
4 Kym Anderson and Hege Norheim.- 'History,  geography  and regional economic integration," in Kym Anderson
and Richard Blackhurst. eds.  Regional  Integration and the Global Trading System. New York: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1993.  p. 20.-~~~~~~~~~~  -22  -
H-However,  RTAs do not necessarily increase global welfare or even the welfare of the
member countries due to trade diversion.  Trade is diverted when '.nports that used to come
from third countries at lower prices become relatively more expensive due to the preferential
access granted to a higher cost source within the agreement.  By diverting trade from outside
to the inside the region, global as well as regional, welfare is reduced.  So world production
is diverted from least-cost to higher-cost supply sources and therefore the world allocation of
resources worsens.  But more importantly, the region loses.  Consumers within the region
have to pay higher prices and the shift in production within the region leads to a high cost or
more inefficient  production.  When the dynamics of this is considered, if one can show that
the increase in costs is a short-run phenomenon and that over time the costs could be reduced
by learning, then there is some semblance  of dynamic gain.  But then the question arises
whether forming an RTA is the best way of inducing leaming and cost reduction.
It has been observed that it is "nearly impossible to determine definitively and
precisely whether trade creation or trade diversion predominates as a result of the
establishment of any particular regional trade agreement." 47 The case for or against regional
trade arrangements is hard to define.  Formation of an RTA may improve the union's terms
of trade vis-a-vis the rest of the world.  Experience provides conflicting evidence to support
or reject RTAs  -on the basis of trade creation and trade diversion.  The CACM and the EC
are examples of arrangements that were successful in creating trade.  However, under MFN,
their trade gains could have been even greater.  At the other extreme, the LAFTA showed a
substantial level of trade diversion and very little trade creation.  However, the actual results
show that "most preferential trading blocs accomplished  little, neither creating nor diverting
much trade.""
A recent study that analyzed the trade effects of the SEM on developing countries
concluded that exports of agriculture and primary products from these countries into the EC
'7 Richard Steinberg.  Art. cit. p. 322.
Il  The World Bank.  Q0. cit.  1994.  p. 65.- 23 -
will suffer from trade diversion as a resuit of the consolidation of the European market.
Exports of manufactures from developing  countries might benefit from the trade creation
effects which will most likely encourage trade exchange in high-tech industries and
machinery. 49 Those that will be able to take advantage of this trade creation will mostly be
the East Asian countries as they are the major suppliers of these kinds of products among the
developing countries.  In the case of the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries)
and Latin America some countries will be seriously damaged by the diversion in trade of
primary and agricultural products.
East Asia is a case in which regional trade agreements have been very loose in terms
of their coverage and their institutional  capacities.  These economies have basically looked to
the world economy.  Intra-regional trade as well as investment  flows have not been hampered
as a result of weak RTAs.  On the contrary, trade among these countries may have increased
even more than under a strong RTA.  Since these economies will remain outward-oriented.
intraregional trade will continue to grow as further liberalization takes place and the barriers
to foreign direct investment are eliminated.  In this respect ASEAN and other East Asian
RTAs could be thought of as GAIT-plus given the increase in regional and international
trade levels.  The East Asian experience makes the case for supporting an open multilateral
trading system.  It provides strong evidence for arguing that RTAs are not necessarily the
alternative for promoting intra-regional  trade creation.  In spite of a non-cohesive regional
scheme East Asian countries have been able to increase their trade and investnent flows.
The attempt to strengthen ASEAN has been more in response to the perceived threat of
regional trading blocs and the undermining of the multilateral trading system rather than to
the interest of consolidating a regional trading bloc.  Given the successful completion of the
Uruguay Round these countries are well positioned to carry out further trade liberalization.
49  Parvin  Alizadeh.  "Trade  Effects of  1992 and  the  Developing Countries,"  in  Joumal  of  International
Development.  Vol. 5.  No. 2.  1993.  pp.  161, 167--24  -
But trade creation alone cannot be a judge of a trade treaty.  Non-trade issues come
into play.  Indeed the dominant motive for the EC was a political  one - to have an entity that
could counterbalance  the Soviet power that emerged after the Second World War.  Similar
considerations  are important  today.  Many of the new initiatives for RTAs are based on the
notion of bargaining  power, they assume that non-membership  could weaken the bargaining
position of one country and/or a group of countries.
Apart from political considerations  there are domestic and foreign political economy
elements that come into play in considering  the advantages  and disadvantages  of RTAs.  An
RTA that commits member countries to bind the tariff pattem could be used to achieve
GAIT-plus trade creation.  This is the case if a country does its best to liberalize its trade
regime under MEN, but finds a limit to the ability to reduce protection beyond a certain
level, then an RTA could be used to "buy out" domestic interests who oppose further
liberalization. The other example is when an RTA becomes  a more credible insurance
against reversal than under MFN, as is the case of Mexico in NAFTA.  An undertakdng
given to the US not to retract the mutual exchange of concessions  is more credible than one
to a multilateral  body.  Thus, a commitment  under MFN could be less powerful since there
is limited policing  of the newly emerged regime and no strong sanction against breaking the
commitment. This is true since dispute settlement  under GATT has been remarkably weak.
There is some hope that the strengthening  of the dispute settlement  mechanism  under WTO
will go some way to readdress this wealness in the international  trading system.
V.  Miniming  Trade Diversion and Other Risks
Since there are definite  prospects for trade diversion in fonning RTAs and the
benefits and costs, or advantages  and disadvantages,  cannot  be clearly and easily determined
a priori, there is merit in a strategy that minmizes risks from forming RTAs.  Such a
strategy would constitute  of a number of elements. It should have both an international  and
domestic perspectives.-25-
From an international perspective there is no doubt that Artr le XXIV has to be
strengthened so that the departures from MFN are subject to a close scrutiny.  An attempt
was made at the Uruguay Round to do this, but met with limited success.  Two provisions
have been better defined within the article.  The transition period for the fonnation plan of
an RTA has been defined, so that there is a clear transition period that should not exceed 10
years.  Also, a formula for the definition of the average tariff has been adopted.  In addition,
the improved dispute settlement  under the WTO could be a deterrent against highly
discriminatory trade agreements.  One loophole that remains is the "enabling clause'  that is
granted to developing countries in which Article XXIV provisions need not be met in
forming RTAs.  But international  public opinion and those industrial countries which have
become increasingly intolerant of special and differential treatment would help to prevent the
use of this route widely.
The real guard against the disadvantages  of RTIAs  has to remain with the countries
themselves.
The first line of defense against the deterioration of an RTA into a trade diversion
device is to have low protection in the first instance.  This means that the potential for trade
diversion would be reduced because the profitability of substituting for imports from low cost
third parties is low.  In other words, it guarantees  that the departure from MEN is limited.
This departure is a second-best option when compared to MFN but it is better than no trade
at all.  Bringing in political economy arguments into the discussion, it is possible to assess
that when there are sectors within each country that will do whatever they can to maintain
protection at the expense of other groups or the whole economy, then an RTA can be useful.
An RTA can become a mechanism for buying out the resistance of this group because this
kind of arrangement will offer greater market access for these sector's production.  Thus, an
RTA that enables a reduction of tariffs and promotes lower costs and increased competition
will result in trade creation, though it may not be the first-best option.- 26 -
The second is to have open RTAs.  That is, keep the membership open to all others
who are willing to subscribe to the provisions of the RTA.  This r,  ::ans to makfe  accession an
easy process (this is in contrast to the EC, which kept Britain out of the agreement for
decades).  The theory supporting the easy accession is that the larger the area under an
agreement, the more diverse would be the resource base and the more likely it would be to
have lower production cost for a variety of products.  Thus NAFTA is an open agreement-
others can join.  Both Chile and Argentina are said to be in the process of becoming
'tpreferred associates." Moreover, the US for the most part is oriented towards free trade
which implies that the cost structure in the US is also nearly akin to world free trade.
Third, while member countries should have lowest possible tariffs, and tariffs being
the only fonn of protection, an attempt must be made to increase competition within the RTA
by removing existing laws that might limit competition. This would lead to the adoption of
competition policies that go beyond what is possible from free trade within a group.  Thus
harmonization of rules and regulations will permit keener competition across frontiers and in
non-tradable sectors.
Fourth, there must be an accompanying  process of multilateral trade liberalization so
that between the member countries and versus the rest of the world come closer over time.
For this to happen, an institutional mechanism must be in place that continues the push
towards greater liberalization with the rest of the world.  The bargaining power created by an
RTA could be used to get greater access to other markets.  So in the dynamic sense, the
RTA becomes an instrument for further liberalization.  It is sometimes hoped that the
bargaining and negotiations could be facilitated when carried out among groups of countries
as opposed to those among individual countries.  In this sense, RTAs are seen as building
blocs, rather than stumbling blocks.
Fifth, macroeconomic policy coordination becomes important if competitive forces are
to be mobilized to have a better allocation of resources wiffiin  an RTA.  Thus, there is a
challenge for Mercosur to adopt a common external tariff with the increasing inflation in-27
Brazil and the parallel appreciation of the Argentine currency.  The framework for adopting
a common external tariff requires macroeconomic  policy coordination.
Sixth, a common market is preferable to a free trade area to the extent that a common
market vitiates the need to have rules of origin.  The enforcement of rules of origin could
lead to the creation of a bureaucracy.  That would in turn introduce discretionality  and bring
in an old style quantitative  restriction-like administration of the trade regime.
Finally, policy and institutional support for reducing barriers may not be enough and
there could be attempts to increase competition  through improving access to countries via
better roads, ports and communication  means.
VI.  Conclusions:  Lessons for Latin  America
MFN-based trade has long been accepted by main stream economists as first best.
When political economy considerations are brought into play, and real world constraints to
the first best are taken into account, departures from MFN principle seem inevitable.  But all
is not lost.  The very political economy aspects could be marshalled to attain the
liberalization of trade by RTAs, beyond what would be feasible under unilateral MFN-based
trade.  This has been called GATT-plus or MFN-plus trade.  The conditions needed to
achieve such a state may be good in the majority of the Latin American countries given the
liberalization of their trade regimes in the mid 1980s to the early 1990s.
The conditions for getting these gains and minimizing the risks of trade diversion can
be easily recognized.  This implies following  the international  rules for creating RTAs
through the revised Article XXV  and eschewing the use of the enabling clause route.  At the
national level attempts must be made to have the lowest possible protection level permitted
by domestic political economy considerations and to negotiate for further reductions in
protection when an RTA is formed-  Paradoxically, departures from MFN then could be used- 28 -
to increase the extent of trade subject to MFN.  Thus, Mexico's accession to NAFTA with a
trading partner such as the US that follows international  rules can give guaranteed access to
its market,beyond  what is available  under "free trade" and can also help to insure against
reversals by the pre-commitment  to open trade by Mexico.
There does not seem to be an inexorable  pattern for RTAs to graduate from free trade
to customs unions and economic  unions even though the European Union has followed such a
path.  There is no economic logic of RTAs Jhat propels them along such a path.  In the case
of the European Union it may be the dominance  of the political  commitment  to unity and the
creation of a supra-national  entity that enabled to evolve into an economic  union.  The
departures from MTN have imposed costs in the form of the huge subsidies  the Community
has had to pay to agriculture as it became increasingly  uncompetitive  compared to the rest of
the world.  Equally, RTAs do not automatically  guarantee  that the trade among the group
could increase, or for that matter such an increase is beneficial, if it leads to trade diversion.
The East Asian experience of MFN trade liberalization  serves as a good reminder of the
advantages  of MEN liberalization  not only for its trade creation, but also for the rapid
increase of intra-regional  trade due to MFN-based trade liberalization. The past Latin
American attempts at integration  were condemned  to failure because they were motivated by
protection and large departres  from the MFN principle.  Clearly, intra-regional  trade
contracted as a result of the attempt to increase  this trade on a preferential basis.
To gain the benefits from the RTAs already in existence  Latin American countries
could do well to participate strongly in the WTO disciplines and continue their efforts at
trade liberalization. They could attempt to forge links among existing agreement to enlarge
the area for trade, open up hitherto restricted sectors and eschew the use of the escape clause
if new agreements are to be signed.
A final consideration for these countries is to increase competition  through better
harmonization of tax, regulatory and corporate policies and the creation of infrastructure that
reduces the costs of transport and leads to the reduction of natural barriers for competition.- 29 -
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